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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

SO MUCH FOR EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE: THE EVERCHANGING STANDARDS FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS
UNDER TITLE VII

I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a woman working as a corporate attorney in a prestigious law
firm. Several of her colleagues refer to her as “stupid,” comment on her body
and tell her about the things they would like to do with her alone. There is
probably little argument that this is considered sexual harassment. Now
consider a woman who is employed as a seasonal truck driver for a
construction company. Her supervisor calls her, among other things, “dumb.”1
The supervisor also states over the CB radio to another employee that he
sometimes wants “to smash a woman in the face.”2 Consider a woman who
works as a secretary in a refinery. Her co-workers display posters of nude and
partially clad women in their offices and in other work areas.3 Additionally
her co-workers use obscene language and call her a “fat ass.”4 Or, consider a
woman working in a factory. A co-worker calls her a slut.5 Her supervisor
looks at her breasts and remarks, “You can rub up against me anytime,” and
also tells the woman, “You would kill me . . . . I don’t know if I can handle it,
but I’d die with a smile on my face.”6 The same supervisor also says, while
the woman is bending over, “Back up. . . . You can back right up to me.”7
Most people would believe these to be clear cases of sexual harassment under
Title VII.8 But are they?
Women who work in fields that are traditionally male-dominated earn
smaller salaries than their male counterparts, are less likely to be promoted,
believed or respected, and, consequently, are more likely to be subject to

1. See Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1536 (10th Cir. 1995). That same
supervisor was also accused of calling the woman a “cunt.” Id.
2. Id. at 1536.
3. See Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 423 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
4. See id. Rabidue’s co-worker habitually used vulgar words such as “cunt,” “tits” and
“pussy.” Id.
5. See Williams v. Gen. Motors, 187 F.3d 553, 559 (6th Cir. 1999).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 et seq. (1994).
1389
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harassment.9 In a study by the U.S. Department of Labor after the enactment
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, figures indicated that there was still significant
disparate treatment of women in the work force.10 In 1958, women earned
60.8% of the average salaries made by men, and ten years later, women still
only earned 58.2% of the salaries that their male counterparts were making.11
That same study indicated that in 1968, 60% of women but only 20% of men
earned less than $5,000 per year, and that 28% of men and 3% of women in the
workforce earned more than $10,000 per year.12 Even though these numbers
were gathered thirty years ago, these types of figures are indicative of the
disparate treatment still prevalent in society, especially in circumstances where
women choose to work in traditionally male-dominated fields.
Does it matter that a woman chooses to work in a factory or in the
construction industry? What if she works in a school? Or a law firm? Should
the environment where an individual works matter when evaluating a sexual
harassment claim? If a court understands Title VII13 to mean that a woman’s
sexual harassment claim depends on the nature of her work environment,
essentially it is judicially sanctioning that a woman will assume the risk of
sexual harassment by entering into certain areas of traditionally maledominated roles.14 In a complex way, most work environments are
traditionally male-dominated in the sense that women have systemically been
denied the opportunity to work outside of the home.15 Accordingly, men have

9. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261 (1972), reprinted
in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137 [hereinafter Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972]. See also,
Virginia Valian, Roundtable: The Cognitive Bases of Gender Bias, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1037,
1038-40 (1999). Professor Valian noted that women’s achievements in the workplace are
generally worth less than men’s. For example, a Bachelor of Arts will increase a man’s salary by
$28,000, but the same degree will only increase a woman’s salary by $9,000. Additionally,
studies indicate that women are generally required to meet a higher criterion for promotion than
men. As Professor Valian noted, “[t]he small but systematic undervaluation of women
culminates in women’s smaller salaries compared to men, slower rates of promotion, and lesser
access to resources necessary to excel at their jobs.” Id. at 1050.
10. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 et seq.
14. See generally Gross, 53 F.3d 1531.
15. For an example of a woman being denied the opportunity to work in a male-dominated
field, see Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 139 (1872) (J. Bradley concurring). In Bradwell, the
plaintiff, a woman named Myra Bradwell, was suing to be admitted into the Illinois State Bar.
The majority of the Court held that her right to practice law was not a privilege and immunity
guaranteed to the plaintiff under the 14th Amendment. However, Justice Bradley, in his
concurring opinion, also believed that the plaintiff should not be admitted into the bar, but for
differing reasons:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the
respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be, woman’s
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always worked outside of the home, including fields that are now considered
female-dominated, such as teaching. Obviously, there are some careers today
that are still male-dominated.16 But should judicially sanctioned exceptions be
made for these work environments by stating our belief that it is excusable or
justifiable in these particular fields to permit a hostile work environment?
There is conflicting evidence which indicates that perhaps not everyone is
willing to embrace a uniform standard in evaluating sexual harassment
claims.17
The unwillingness to create a uniform standard for evaluating sexual
harassment claims perhaps is not the largest obstacle for those who have been
sexually harassed to overcome. It does create a significant problem, however,
for those individuals who are harassed and feel that they have no recourse
because they work in a traditionally blue collar or male-dominated
environment.18 This also creates significant barriers to women in the
workplace. Because there is not a uniform standard for evaluating sexual
harassment claims, women are faced with a difficult decision—sue their
harasser and face the consequences, or put up with the harassment. However,
if the woman works in a blue collar environment, her decision becomes even
more difficult. Because it is not clear whether certain work environments will
dictate a stricter sexual harassment standard, the woman must make an
increasingly difficult choice—sue under Title VII, hoping that the court will
not sanction “traditionally” crude behavior, or endure the hostile work
environment.
Courts are essentially justifying crude behavior in certain work
environments, simply because these “[i]ndelicate forms of expression [in the
work environment] are accepted or endured as normal human behavior.”19
These courts are also implying that women who work in blue collar fields are
accustomed to this behavior and thus are somehow better equipped to deal with
protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of
the family organization . . . indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs
to the domain and functions of womanhood.
Id. at 141.
16. Some fields are even protected to remain male-dominated if it is determined that sex is a
“bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise. . . .” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1994). See also JUDITH
BAER, WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAW 80 (2d ed. 1996).
17. See Gross, 53 F.3d at 1537.
18. See Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff’d,
805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that the standard for sexual harassment claims is “different
depending upon the work environment”).
19. See Gross, 53 F.3d at 1537 (10th Cir. 1995). This is a classic example of judicially
sanctioning a disparate standard for males in the workplace and accordingly permitting employers
to manifest these differences in their working environments.
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it. Accordingly, it seems as though the courts are discouraging these women
from filing otherwise valid sexual harassment claims.
This Comment analyzes whether certain work environments should dictate
a stricter standard for sexual harassment claims, and more specifically, whether
a woman working in a blue collar or traditionally male-dominated industry
should have to meet a higher threshold of abuse for her sexual harassment
claim or not. Part II of this Comment outlines the relevant case history as well
as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) and how it relates to sexual harassment claims. Part
III details the current status of the case law and the notable circuit split with
regard to the context of the working environment.20 Part IV contains the
author’s analysis of the circuit split. This Comment concludes by offering a
solution to the differing viewpoints of the circuits to achieve a more uniform
standard under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
A.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted to protect individuals from
hostile work environments and unlawful employment practices.21 The original
purpose of Title VII was “to eliminate . . . discrimination in employment based
on race, color, religion, or national origin.”22 While sex-based discrimination
was not included in the original codification, it was added at the last minute on
the floor of the House of Representatives.23
20. Compare Gross, 53 F.3d at 1538 (holding that the standard for evaluating sexual
harassment claims depends upon the context of the work environment), with Williams v. Gen.
Motors, 187 F.3d 553, 564 (6th Cir. 1999) (expressly rejecting the Tenth Circuit’s view that the
standard for evaluating sexual harassment claims varies depending upon the work environment).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) reads as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(2) To limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
22. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 (1964), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391 [hereinafter Civil Rights Act of 1964].
23. See BAER, supra note 16, at 80. The original Title VII did not address sex
discrimination. The amendment adding “sex” was proposed by a notorious opponent of civil
rights who urged his colleagues “to protect our spinster friends in their ‘right’ to a husband and
family.” This last minute joke failed when a coalition of women legislators saved the
amendment. Id.
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The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was established
by authority of Title VII in 1964.24 However, the EEOC’s authority was
limited in that it could not issue judicially enforceable orders.25 In 1972,
Congress re-evaluated Title VII and determined that the employment needs of
women and minorities were still not being met,26 and therefore Congress
granted the EEOC more authority to issue cease and desist orders to employers
who continued to ignore or circumvent Title VII mandates.27 The purpose
behind the legislation was “to implement in a meaningful way the national
policy of equal employment opportunity for employees without discrimination
because of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex.”28
In its efforts to reduce and eliminate sexual harassment issues, the EEOC
codified several different guidelines. However, these guidelines are somewhat
vague and perhaps even contradictory in nature. For example, the EEOC
established guidelines for sexual harassment claims, including what constitutes
sexual harassment, how to evaluate those claims and when an employer will be
held liable for an employee’s conduct.29 In determining what will constitute a
sexual harassment claim, the EEOC considered the following:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1)
submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or
condition of an individual’s employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such
conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions
affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.30

The EEOC did not mention anywhere in this codification differing standards of
evaluating sexual harassment claims contingent upon the context of the work

24. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.
25. Id. Under the authority of Title VII, the EEOC was limited to essentially conciliatory
functions. Id.
26. Id. According to the legislative history of 1972,
[w]omen currently comprise approximately 38% of the total work force of the Nation.
There are approximately 30 million employed women. Recent statistics released from the
U.S. Department of Labor indicate that there exists a profound economic discrimination
against women workers . . . . Women are subject to economic deprivation as a class.
Their self-fulfillment and development is frustrated because of their sex.
Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1998).
30. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a). For purposes of this Comment, subsection (3) will
constitute most of the analysis. In determining whether the standard should be different for
varying work environments, the primary concern is whether it is an “intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment.” Id.
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environment, presumably indicating that the EEOC did not believe that the
work environment should be a guiding factor in evaluating sexual harassment
claims.
However, the EEOC also sanctioned a totality of circumstances test31 that
it believed would be key in evaluating claims of sexual harassment under Title
VII:
In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the
Commission will look at the record as a whole and at the totality of the
circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in
which the alleged incidents occurred. The determination of the legality of a
particular action will be made from the facts, on a case by case basis.32

This codification implies that, in fact, there are varying standards for sexual
harassment, depending upon the context of the work environment.33
The EEOC also emphasized the importance of preventing and eliminating
sexual harassment in the work place by taking affirmative action, disapproving
of poor work behavior and sensitizing employees to the repercussions of sexual
harassment.34 Most notably, the EEOC determined it was crucial that “an
employer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from
occurring . . . .”35 It was deemed important that the employer take affirmative
steps to prevent the harassment before it began and to overcome that
harassment before it spun out of control.36
While it appears that the EEOC’s codifications have set forth its opinions
on whether the context of the work environment dictates a higher standard in
evaluating sexual harassment claims, these somewhat contradictory guidelines,
as well as later case law, indicate that it is not altogether clear whether the

31. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). This “totality of
circumstances test” was set forth by the Supreme Court in Harris in 1993 and was also codified
by the EEOC in the same year. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b).
32. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (emphasis added).
33. Id. (noting that the EEOC will look at “the context in which the alleged incidents
occurred.” While this appears to set forth the EEOC’s opinion on the matter, later case law will
show that it is not altogether clear whether certain work environments should dictate higher
standards.).
34. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f).
Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment. An employer should
take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring, such as
affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong disapproval, developing appropriate
sanctions, informing employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of
harassment under Title VII, and developing methods to sensitize all concerned.
Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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work environment should dictate stricter standards.37 This confusion has left
some serious interpretive issues up to the federal courts. The most notable of
these issues is the circuit split addressed in this Comment regarding the context
of the work environment.38 While Title VII was inspired by lofty goals, it
wasn’t necessarily embraced by employers.39 Congress enabled the EEOC to
be more proactive in its fight against discrimination and harassment in the
workplace.40 However, the EEOC codifications did not address all areas of
sexual harassment concerns. It is these omissions that are the concerns of
federal courts.
B.

Title VII Interpretative Case Law

The Supreme Court has decided many sexual harassment claims pursuant
to Title VII. Most certainly, the breadth and scope of sexual harassment has
expanded over the years to adjust to changing perceptions in society. One
issue the Court has failed to address over time, however, is whether certain
work environments, specifically blue collar or traditionally male-dominated
fields, should be required to meet a higher threshold of sexual harassment than
other fields. What follows sets forth the early case law leading up to the circuit
split regarding the work environment standard in sexual harassment cases
brought pursuant to Title VII.
i.

Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.

In an early case, a federal district court was faced with a claim of sexual
harassment under Title VII where the plaintiff, Rabidue, worked as a secretary
in a refining company.41 The court first addressed whether Title VII even
spoke to sexual harassment claims. The court found that sexual harassment “is
within the clear letter—and probably the spirit—of Title VII,”42 and therefore
37. See Williams v. Gen. Motors, 187 F.3d 553, 564 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that the
standard for sexual harassment should not vary depending upon the context of the work
environment).
38. Compare Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding
that the standard for evaluating sexual harassment claims depends upon the context of the work
environment), with Williams, 187 F.3d at 564 (expressly rejecting the Tenth Circuit’s view that
the standard for sexual harassment varies depending upon the work environment).
39. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. Congress recognized that “[d]espite
the commitment of Congress to the goal of equal employment opportunity for all our citizens, the
machinery created by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not adequate. Despite the progress which
has been made . . . discrimination against minorities and women continues.” Id.
40. Id. (“It is essential that . . . effective enforcement procedures be provided the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission to strengthen its efforts to reduce discrimination in
employment.”).
41. See Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 422 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
42. Id. at 428. The court noted that under the original Title VII, sexual harassment was not a
large concern. In fact, the court noted that the prohibition against sexual harassment in the work
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sexual harassment claims were valid assertions under Title VII. In that case,
Rabidue worked with a man who used vulgar language and made obscene
comments about women.43 Additionally, other male employees displayed
when their offices and other prominent work areas pictures of nude or partially
clad women.44 The district court held that courts are entitled to contemplate
the employment environment in which the plaintiff suffered the harassment
when evaluating the validity of the plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim.45
Accordingly, this gives courts authority to make considerations regarding the
education of the plaintiff’s co-workers and supervisors, the physical design of
the plaintiff’s work area and the reasonable expectations of the plaintiff
regarding the kind of conduct he or she reasonably believes constitutes sexual
harassment.46
The court went on to hold that the standard for determining sexual
harassment is different depending upon the work environment.47 Most
troubling was the court’s determination that “it cannot seriously be disputed
that in some work environments, humor and language are rough hewn and
vulgar. Sexual jokes, sexual conversations and girlie magazines may abound.
Title VII was not meant to—or can—change this.”48 Accordingly, the district
court found that Rabidue had not established a valid sexual harassment claim
and therefore ruled against her.49
place was added to Title VII as a last minute joke by a notorious opponent of civil rights.
However, while sexual harassment was not originally a concern, it is one of the most cited Title
VII issues today. Id. at 427-29. See also BAER, supra note 16, at 79-80.
43. Rabidue, 584 F. Supp. at 423 (noting that one co-worker of Rabidue used words like
“cunt,” “pussy” and “tits” and that same co-worker called Rabidue a “fat ass”).
44. Id. The court found that Rabidue was subjected to these pictures during her work day.
Id.
45. Id. at 430.
46. Id. The court was interpreting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1998), which defines sexual
harassment as conduct which “has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work
environment.” The court was analyzing the use of the word “unreasonably.” Id.
47. Id.
48. Rabidue, 584 F. Supp. at 430. The court went on to say:
It must never be forgotten that Title VII is the federal court mainstay in the struggle for
equal employment opportunity for the female workers of America. But it is quite
different to claim that Title VII was designed to bring about a magical transformation in
the social mores of American workers.
Id.
49. Id. at 433. The court noted:
While the vulgarity [of the co-worker] certainly was not commendable, it remains that the
evidence did not go beyond showing that this one employee was vulgar. Furthermore
after reviewing the evidence, plaintiff’s overall work experience was not substantially
affected by Mr. Henry’s vulgarity. Instead, the vulgarity merely constituted an annoying
– but fairly insignificant – part of the total job environment . . . . Living in this milieu, the
average American should not be legally offended by sexually explicit posters.
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Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson

The Supreme Court faced an opportunity to address sexual harassment
standards in 1986.50 In Meritor, the plaintiff, Vinson, worked in a white-collar
bank,51 and she testified that her supervisor invited her out to dinner and
suggested that they have sex.52 Vinson testified that she initially refused, but
then agreed out of fear of losing her job.53 Vinson further testified that her
supervisor continued to make sexual advances, in addition to fondling her,
exposing himself and forcibly raping her.54 This case is significant because it
occurred in the white collar industry of banking, indicating that sexual
harassment is not just a blue collar problem; instead it is a systemic one that
can occur anywhere. Even though the Supreme Court was given an early
opportunity to set forth its sentiments relating to sexual harassment standards,
it did not address the issue of whether the work environment should vary the
standard.55 Rather, the Court only held that “[f]or sexual harassment to be
actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to ‘alter the conditions of
[the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.’”56
iii. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.
The Supreme Court had another opportunity in 1993 to set forth a standard
for analyzing sexual harassment claims.57 In Harris, the Court established a
more uniform standard, but it failed to address whether certain workplace
environments should dictate a stricter standard.58 In Harris, the female
employee worked as a manager at an equipment rental company and was
subjected to insults and sexual innuendoes by the company’s president.59
Harris was insulted because of her gender and was degraded in front of other
employees.60 On several different occasions, the president of the company
said, “[Y]ou’re a women, what do you know,” and “[W]e need a man as the

Id.
50. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
51. Id. at 59-60.
52. Id. at 60.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Most notably, the Supreme Court did not seem to indicate that it mattered where the
plaintiff worked, only that he or she was exposed to an abusive working environment.
56. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (citing Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
The Supreme Court ultimately held that Vinson’s hostile work environment sexual harassment
claim was a valid claim under Title VII and was therefore an actionable claim pursuant to Title
VII. Id. at 73.
57. See Harris v. Forklift System, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 19.
60. Id.
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rental manager.”61 He also called Harris “a dumb ass woman” and suggested,
in front of Harris’s co-workers, that he and Harris should “go to the Holiday
Inn to negotiate [Harris’s] raise.”62 These, among other acts by the president,
forced Harris to quit her job.63
The district court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
president’s “conduct did not create an abusive environment.”64 The district
court believed the correct standard to be whether the plaintiff’s psychological
well-being was seriously affected by the conduct.65 The Supreme Court
reversed and held that “[c]onduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to
create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment—an environment
that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive—is beyond Title VII’s
purview.”66 Consequently, the Court held that not only does the work
environment have to be objectively hostile, the victim must reasonably believe
it to be hostile too.67 Accordingly, the Court stated “if the victim does not
subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not
actually altered the conditions of the victim’s employment, and there is no
Title VII violation.”68
While the Court did not expressly speak to the work environment issue, it
did set forth a “totality of circumstances” analysis.69 The Court said in dictum,
“whether an environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be determined only by
looking at all the circumstances. They may include the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably
interferes with an employee’s work performance.”70 The Court also said the
“effect on the employee’s psychological well-being is, of course, relevant to
determining whether the plaintiff actually found the environment abusive. But
while psychological harm, like any other relevant factor, may be taken into
account, no single factor is required.”71 This totality test, while not necessarily
speaking to the work environment issue, signaled a precursor for the circuit

61. Id.
62. Harris, 510 U.S. at 19.
63. Id. A few of these other acts included the company president asking Harris and other
female co-workers to retrieve coins from his front pants pocket, he threw objects on the ground in
front of Harris and asked her and other women to pick up the objects, and he made sexual
innuendoes about Harris’ clothing. Id.
64. Id. at 19-20.
65. Id. at 20.
66. Id. at 21-22.
67. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 23.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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courts in analyzing sexual harassment claims in light of the varying work
environments.72
iv. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.
In 1998, the Court faced a groundbreaking case—whether same sex
harassment falls under Title VII.73 The Court held, in fact, that same sex
harassment does fall within the protection of Title VII.74 Interestingly enough,
even though the Court had ample opportunity in the past to discuss it, the Court
finally decided this was an appropriate case to discuss the social context of
sexual harassment:
In [all] harassment cases, that inquiry requires careful consideration of the
social context in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its
target. A professional football player’s working environment is not severely or
pervasively abusive, for example, if the coach smacks him on the buttocks as
he heads onto the field—even if the same behavior would reasonably be
experienced as abusive by the coach’s secretary (male or female) back at the
office. The real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a
constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships
which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the
physical acts performed. Common sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to
social context will enable courts and juries to distinguish between simple
teasing or roughhousing among members of the same sex, and conduct which a
reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would find severely hostile or
abusive.75

While this does not truly speak to the work environment issue, it does confuse
matters for lower courts looking for some guidance. After this case, it is not
altogether clear whether courts in looking at the work environment should be
sensitive to the “social context”76 of the work environment or whether other
factors should be the prevailing guidelines.
When the Supreme Court states that courts should be sensitive to “social
context,” it is unclear whether the Court is referring merely to the “social
72. Compare Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding
that the standard for evaluating sexual harassment claims depends upon the context of the work
environment), with Williams v. Gen. Motors, 187 F.3d 553, 564 (6th Cir. 1999) (expressly
rejecting the Tenth Circuit’s view that the standard for sexual harassment varies depending upon
the work environment). In Harris, the Court indicated that whether an environment can be
hostile is determined “by looking at all the circumstances.” 510 U.S. at 23 (emphasis added).
The Court’s use of the word “circumstances” foreshadows the Tenth Circuit’s later reliance on
this totality of circumstances test to sanction a sliding scale standard for evaluating sexual
harassment claims depending on the work environment.
73. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
74. Id. at 79-80.
75. Id. at 81-82.
76. Id.
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context” of actions in the workplace, or to the “social context” of the actual
workplace.77 There is a distinction between these two statements. Under the
first, the social context of actions taken in the workplace means that one action
taken in a certain environment would have a different meaning than it would in
another environment. However, calling a woman a “slut” in the factory really
is not any different than calling a woman a “slut” in the office. Or slapping a
woman on the backside in the factory really is not any different than slapping a
woman on the backside in the office. However, the social context of the actual
workplace is different from the social context of the action taken. By being
sensitive to the social context of the work environment, courts are essentially
allowing employers to excuse both their own and their employee’s behavior
based upon things such as a lack of education or a sense of tradition. It is not
surprising that lower courts may tend to be confused by the language in Oncale
and have, in fact, misconstrued the meaning and intention behind this dictum.78
v.

Faragher v. Boca Raton and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth

In 1998, the Supreme Court was confronted with two more sexual
harassment cases.79 In Faragher, the plaintiff worked as a lifeguard under the
supervision of three men.80 Faragher asserted that two of the supervisors on
multiple occasions committed offensive touching, made lewd remarks and
spoke of women in offensive terms.81 More specifically, Faragher claimed that
one supervisor claimed he would never promote a woman and that another
supervisor told Faragher, “Date me or clean the toilets for a year.”82
In Burlington Industries, the plaintiff, Ellerth, worked as a salesperson for
a large corporation.83 Ellerth claimed that a company manager made remarks
about her breasts, told her to “loosen up” and then warned that he “could make
[Ellerth’s] life very hard or very easy at Burlington.”84 When being considered
for a promotion, the manager said Ellerth was not “loose enough” and the
manager proceeded to rub Ellerth’s knee.85 The manager then told Ellerth that
she would be working “with men who work in factories, and they certainly like
women with pretty butts/legs.”86 On a later date, the manager told Ellerth, “I

77. Id.
78. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 571 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
79. See generally Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998)
80. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 747.
84. Id. at 748.
85. Id.
86. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2001]

SO MUCH FOR EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE

1401

don’t have time for you . . . unless you want to tell me what you’re wearing.”87
The manager then told Ellerth that if she wore shorter skirts, “it would make
[her] job a whole heck of a lot easier.”88
Even though the Court was faced with two more important sexual
harassment cases, the Court once again did not address the issue of work
environment and simply reaffirmed its generic stance set forth in Oncale.89
The Court indicated its faith in the fact that serious sexual harassment claims
would be weeded out from those less serious offenses.90 In these two cases,
the Court was faced with the issue of the employer being held vicariously
liable for discrimination or harassment caused by a supervisor.91 In both cases
the Court held that the employer is subject to vicarious liability for a hostile
work environment created by a supervisor.92 Separate from its holding of
vicarious liability, the Court did not address whether the context of the work
environment should matter in evaluating sexual harassment claims. As a
result, lower federal courts are left with the confusing work context dictum set
forth in Oncale—not sure how it applies to them or how it affects their
decisions in sexual harassment claims.
This is where the Supreme Court has left matters for the time being. It is
not clear whether the work environment should be taken into account after
Oncale. But there is clearly confusion on the matter in the lower courts, as
noted below.
III. CURRENT STATUS OF THE LAW: THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
While the Supreme Court has decided multiple sexual harassment cases
since the advent of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, there still remain some cloudy
issues, including whether certain work environments should dictate stricter
standards in evaluating sexual harassment claims. Most notably, there is a

87. Id.
88. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 748.
89. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (noting that “the standards for judging hostility are
sufficiently demanding to ensure that Title VII does not become a ‘general civility code’”) (citing
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998)).
90. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (citing B. LINDEMANN & D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT
IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 175 (1992) (finding that the standards for judging hostility “will filter out
complaints attacking ‘the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of
abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing’”)).
91. See generally Faragher, 524 U.S. 775; Burlington Indus. 524 U.S. 742.
92. See generally Faragher, 524 U.S. 775; Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. 742. This same
vicarious liability standard was codified in the Code of Federal Regulations: “With respect to
conduct between fellow employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in
the workplace where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have
known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective
action.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1998).
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circuit split between the Sixth and Tenth Circuits regarding this matter.93 What
follows sets forth the circuit split regarding whether the work environment
should dictate a stricter standard in evaluating sexual harassment claims
brought pursuant to Title VII.
A.

Gross v. Burggraf Construction Company – The Tenth Circuit’s Approach

While Gross originated before the confusion set forth in Oncale, it still
remains an important case in the development of whether the work
environment should matter in evaluating sexual harassment claims.94 Gross,
the plaintiff, was employed as a truck driver for the defendant construction
company, and was supervised by one George Anderson.95 Gross was a
seasonal worker and an hourly employee.96 After Gross was laid off, she filed
suit against the defendant construction company and Anderson for gender
discrimination in violation of Title VII.97 Gross alleged that Anderson called
her a “cunt”; he said over the radio to another employee, “Mark, sometimes,
don’t you just want to smash a woman in the face?”; Anderson referred to
Gross as “dumb” and used profanity in reference to her.98 Both defendants
moved for summary judgment in the United States District Court for the
District of Wyoming and the district court granted the motion.99
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit determined it would follow the “totality of
circumstances” test set forth by the Supreme Court in Meritor.100 In doing so,
the Tenth Circuit determined it must look at the work environment to
determine if the plaintiff established a legitimate Title VII claim.101 The court
said: “In the real world of construction work, profanity and vulgarity are not
perceived as hostile or abusive. Indelicate forms of expression are accepted or
endured as normal human behavior.”102 The court went on to hold that it
“must evaluate [plaintiff’s] claim of gender discrimination in the context of a
blue collar environment where crude language is commonly used by male and
93. Compare Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding
that the standard for evaluating sexual harassment claims depends upon the context of the work
environment), with Williams v. Gen. Motors, 187 F.3d 553, 564 (6th Cir. 1999) (expressly
rejecting the Tenth Circuit’s view that the standard for sexual harassment varies depending upon
the work environment). This Comment only addresses the reasoning used by the Sixth Circuit and
the Tenth Circuit to reach their respective decisions in these two cases. Accordingly, the author
does not attempt to evaluate the merits of either of the plaintiffs’ claims.
94. See Gross, 53 F.3d 1531.
95. Id. at 1534.
96. Id. at 1535.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1536.
99. Gross, 53 F.3d at 1536.
100. Id. at 1537 (citing Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986)).
101. Id.
102. Id.
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female employees.”103 The court also stated that “[s]peech that might be
offensive or unacceptable in a prep school faculty meeting, or on the floor of
Congress, is tolerated in other work environments.”104 The Tenth Circuit
agreed with the district court’s reasoning in Rabidue, which held that “the
standard for determining sex[ual] harassment would be different depending
upon the work environment. Indeed, it cannot be seriously disputed that in
some work environments, humor and language are rough hewn and vulgar.
Sexual jokes, sexual conversations and girlie magazines may abound.”105 The
Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s findings that the plaintiff failed to
establish that the sexual harassment was pervasive or severe enough to alter the
terms, conditions or privileges of employment.106
B.

Williams v. General Motors Corporation – The Sixth Circuit’s Approach

Marilyn Williams sued General Motors, her employer of thirty years, for
sexual harassment.107 Williams worked in the tool crib on the midnight shift in
a General Motors plant in Ohio.108 Williams alleged in her complaint that
another employee continuously used the “F-word” in his vocabulary; the same
employee called Williams a “slut.” William’s general supervisor looked at
William’s breasts and said “You can rub up against me anytime;” he also told
Williams to “back up” and, “You can just back right up to me” when Williams
was bending over; and that the co-worker also said, “I’m sick and tired of these
fucking women.”109
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted
summary judgment for General Motors, holding that the alleged sexual
harassment was not so severe or pervasive as to constitute a hostile work
environment.110 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, felt that there
was still a genuine issue of material fact and reversed the district court’s grant
of summary judgment as to William’s sexual harassment claim.111
The Sixth Circuit took issue with the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in Gross
and expressly rejected “the view that the standard for sexual harassment varies
depending on the work environment.”112 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit
disagreed with the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Gross113 stating:

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 1538 (emphasis added).
Gross, 53 F.3d at 1538.
Id. (citing Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1984)).
Gross, 53 F.3d at 1547.
See Williams v. Gen. Motors, 187 F.3d 553, 558 (6th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 559.
Id.
Id. at 560 (citing Harris v. Forklift System, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).
Id. at 568.
Williams, 187 F.3d at 564.
Id.
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We do not believe that a woman who chooses to work in the male-dominated
trades relinquishes her right to be free from sexual harassment; indeed, we find
this reasoning to be illogical, because it means that the more hostile the
environment, and the more prevalent the sexism, the more difficult it is for a
Title VII plaintiff to prove that sex-based conduct is sufficiently severe or
pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment.114

The Sixth Circuit noted that district courts were supposed to “look at the
totality of circumstances and the context of the alleged harassment,” but that
“does not mean that courts can point to long-standing or traditional hostility
toward women to excuse hostile-work-environment harassment.”115
The court pointed out that Williams was still required to establish that her
work environment was objectively hostile and that she subjectively perceived
the work environment to be hostile.116 The court appeared to agree with the
Supreme Court’s logic in Oncale that sensitivity to social context is
appropriate, but disagreed with the Tenth Circuit’s logic that courts can make
judgments as to the woman’s assumption of risk upon entering a hostile work
environment.117
C. Williams v. General Motors Corporation – The Dissenting Opinion
Judge Ryan of the Sixth Circuit dissented from the majority opinion.118
The dissent believed the majority opinion was flawed because it asserted that
the totality of circumstances test does not include the context of the workplace
environment.119 Accordingly, the dissent contended that the majority opinion
was “dead wrong” because the Supreme Court had made it “very clear that the
workplace environment indeed is a component of the totality of circumstances
to be taken into account in assessing a claim of sexual harassment under Title
VII.”120 Additionally, the dissent noted the Tenth Circuit’s approach in Gross
and cited the case favorably.121
Furthermore, the dissent noted that in today’s civilized society, it is easy to
make the argument that an employer should be obligated to provide a sensible
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.; see also Harris v. Forklift System, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (setting forth the
totality of circumstances test to be used by lower federal courts in evaluating sexual harassment
claims); Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-88 (1998) (reaffirming Harris’ totality test).
117. Williams, 187 F.3d at 564 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S.
75, 81 (1998)).
118. Williams, 187 F.3d at 569 (Ryan, J., dissenting.)
119. Id. at 570-71.
120. Id. Judge Ryan was relying on the language set forth in Oncale: “In [all] harassment
cases, that inquiry requires careful consideration of the social context in which the particular
behavior occurs and is experienced by its target.” Oncale, 523 U.S. at 75.
121. Williams, 187 F.3d at 571 (citing Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538
(10th Cir. 1995)).
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working environment where sexual harassment is not tolerated, but that is not
what Title VII was meant to do.122 Judge Ryan went on to note that the shop
floor “is a rough and indelicate environment in which finishing school manners
are not the behavioral norm.”123 Accordingly, when a woman decides to enter
a traditionally male-dominated work environment “that may be tastelessly
suffused with rudeness, personal insensitivity, crude behavior, and locker room
language, she must do so with the understanding that Congress has not
legislated against such behavior and such a workplace environment.”124 The
dissent noted that just because the work place is hostile does not mean that the
employer is free from liability.125 In fact, he argued the employer would be
liable, but only if the hostile encounters were on a regular basis and the context
of the work environment was taken into account.126
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CIRCUIT’S VARYING APPROACHES
A.

The Tenth Circuit’s Approach

The Tenth Circuit’s approach in evaluating sexual harassment claims is to
look at the context of the work environment to determine whether the
harassment is sufficiently severe enough to constitute a valid claim.127 This
approach, while problematic, is also understandable when viewed under the
microscope of historical influences.128 The Tenth Circuit felt obligated to look
at the work environment in evaluating Gross’s claims of sexual harassment.129
In doing so, the court went so far as to say: “In the real world of construction
work, profanity and vulgarity are not perceived as hostile or abusive.
Indelicate forms of expression are accepted or endured as normal human
behavior.”130 However, concentrating on whether words are “indelicate” takes
away from the true problem of sexual harassment claims—that is, whether the
work environment is so objectively hostile or abusive as seen by a reasonable
person, or, subjectively hostile or abusive, as to constitute a Title VII
violation.131

122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Williams, 187 F.3d at 571.
127. Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538 (10th Cir. 1995).
128. See Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1918 (2000) (“Even when we
enact laws that recognize and seek to equalize women’s work roles, the remnants of family-wage
ideology creep into the law and deplete much of its transformative potential.”).
129. Gross, 53 F.3d at 1537.
130. Id. (emphasis added).
131. Harris v. Forklift System, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993). There are two different forms
of sexual harassment claims: quid pro quo and hostile work environments. Quid pro quo is
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Notably, the standard is an objective one—meaning that the work
environment is hostile or abusive to a reasonable person, not a reasonable man
or a reasonable woman.132 This type of standard indicates that in order to
determine whether a work environment is hostile, courts need only look to a
reasonable person standard. However, under the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning,
courts should only look at what a reasonable man or reasonable woman
perceives to be hostile.133
The Tenth Circuit’s reasoning seems not only to justify, but also to
sanction “indelicate” behavior simply because work environments such as
construction areas or factories are traditionally unpolished or categorically
unrefined.134 Accordingly, the court takes the attitude that Title VII was not
meant to change people’s attitudes in the work place.135 This is problematic
thinking. If Title VII was not meant to change people’s attitudes, what exactly
is the purpose of it?
While it may be conceded that some work environments are obviously less
refined than others, this should not mean that courts can justify or excuse the
unrefined behavior. As stereotypical as it may seem, a blue collar job is more
likely to be subject to an unrefined work environment. But under the Tenth
Circuit’s reasoning, a woman in a blue collar environment will have to prove
more, meaning she would have to be subjected to more objectionable behavior
than a woman working in an office or in a school.136 This is an inequitable

recognized when an employer imposes a condition of job benefits only in exchange for sexual
favors. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 908-09 (11th Cir. 1982). Hostile work
environments, on the other hand, are created when an employee is faced with sexual advances
that are pervasive and severe enough to create a hostile or abusive work environment. See
Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. Because a hostile work environment can be created by co-workers, in this
Comment only the hostile work environment will be analyzed as it pertains to standards for
evaluating sexual harassment claims.
132. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22.
133. See Gross, 53 F.3d at 1538.
134. Id.
135. Id. While the court doesn’t explicitly state this presumption, it does quote the Rabidue
court which affirmatively set forth:
Indeed, it cannot seriously be disputed that in some work environments, humor and
language are rough hewn and vulgar. Sexual jokes, sexual conversations and girlie
magazines may abound. Title VII was not meant to—or can—change this. It must never
be forgotten that Title VII is the federal court mainstay in the struggle for equal
employment opportunity for the female workers of America. But it is quite different to
claim that Title VII was designed to bring about a magical transformation in the social
mores of American workers.
Gross, 53 F.3d at 138 (citing Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D.
Mich. 1984)).
136. This was the rationale of the Sixth Circuit in Williams, 187 F.3d at 564. There the court
noted it was illogical to assume that a woman who works in a male-dominated field relinquishes
her right to work in harassment free environment. The court said that if this was the standard, it
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result—one that seems like a bitter pill to swallow, given that Title VII was
meant to make the work place more equal and to prevent both discrimination
and the disparate treatment of women.137 If this is the result, Title VII has
made the work place “more” equal for women by allowing them to enter into
male-dominated fields, but consequently, has shifted the burden of proving
sexual harassment claims to women who choose to work in a male-dominated
field, simply because they have exercised their rights pursuant to Title VII.138
Ironically, the same mechanism that allows women the freedom to enter the
work force would also be interpreted to mean that those same women may
suffer the consequences for exercising that freedom.
Of course, there are noticeable differences in certain fields of work. A
factory floor probably has a higher level of crudeness than a doctor’s office.
But the problem is not the work environment itself; it is the actions taken in the
work environment that matter. Justice Scalia wrote for the Supreme Court:
A professional football player’s working environment is not severely or
pervasively abusive, for example, if the coach smacks him on the buttocks as
he heads onto the field—even if the same behavior would reasonably be
experienced as abusive by the coach’s secretary (male or female) back at the
office.139

Justice Scalia’s argument shows that one action can convey different
connotations in different work environments.140 Justice Scalia was simply
pointing out that lower courts should be aware of this difference. However,

would be an inequitable result: “[T]he more hostile the environment, and the more prevalent the
sexism, the more difficult it is for a Title VII plaintiff to prove that sex-based conduct is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment.” Id.
137. See Civil Rights Act of 1964; see also supra notes 21-22.
138. What the term “equality” means is controversial. For example, there are two types of
feminism that deal with this notion of trying to make women adapt to a man’s environment—
equality feminism and difference feminism. Equality feminism suggests that all gender-based
classifications should be abolished, and the notion that all men are created equal should be
reconfigured to include women. Equality feminism urges that men should be viewed as the
benchmark or reference point to women, and that women should be accorded the same
opportunities as men based on this benchmark. The other theory, difference feminism, suggests
that because men and women are inherently different in some regards (such as reproduction
capabilities and child-rearing), the law should recognize the ways that men and women differ and
accordingly accommodate those differences. See NANCY LEVIT, THE GENDER LINE: MEN,
WOMEN AND THE LAW 189-93 (1998). See also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex
Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1290-91 (1991) (“Society defines women . . .
according to differences from men: hence the sex difference, as gender is customarily termed.
Then equality law tells women that they are entitled to equal treatment mainly to the degree they
are the same as men.”).
139. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
140. See Severity of Harassment and Economic Class, 16 No. 19 EMPLOYMENT ALERT 3
(September 16, 1999).
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Justice Scalia’s example is confusing.141 After the Oncale opinion, it seems to
say that lower courts should distinguish certain work environments when
evaluating Title VII claims.142 However, this is troubling because it appears
that is probably not what Justice Scalia intended.
The troubling part of the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning is that it is implicitly
suggesting that women (or men) should assume the risk when they enter a
particular type of work environment that society presumes is traditionally
“rough hewn and vulgar.”143 After the Gross case, all women within the
jurisdiction of the Tenth Circuit who are working in the construction industry
(or any other traditionally male-dominated field) and who file sexual
harassment claims may find those claims to be taken less seriously than those
that occurred in a white collar environment, simply because in the construction
field, “profanity and vulgarity are not perceived as hostile or abusive.”144 The
Tenth Circuit has left no consistent rule to apply in sexual harassment claims if
the court relies on a sliding scale to evaluate those claims. This is troubling for
women in hostile work environments who are looking to file a sexual
harassment claim. While it is known that the courts will use a “totality of
circumstances” test,145 and they will also look at whether the work
environment is objectively hostile or abusive as seen by a reasonable person,
or, subjectively hostile or abusive,146 victims looking to prove their cases are
left with many questions.
If a woman working in an automotive parts factory wants to file a sexual
harassment claim, does that mean she has to be subjected to twice as much
objectionable behavior as a woman working in an accountant’s office? Three
times as much? Does she have to be harassed every day in order to establish a
valid claim? Every other day? Does the harassment she is subjected to have to
be more objectionable than the harassment a woman working in the
accountant’s office sustains? The answers to these questions are not clear.
The problem with implying that victims will assume the risk by entering
certain categories of work is that it focuses on the victim’s conduct, rather than
the defendant’s conduct, to potentially relieve the defendant from liability.
This is analogous to focusing on the behavior of a rape victim, rather than
focusing on the behavior of the rapist himself. It is essentially the same as
saying the woman asked for the harassment because she was willing to enter
into a field that was traditionally male-dominated. This is misplacing the
blame. A woman should not have to assume the risk when entering certain
141. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 570-71 (Ryan, J. dissenting). The dissent relies on Justice
Scalia’s opinion in Oncale too broadly.
142. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81-82.
143. Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538 (10th Cir. 1995).
144. Id. at 1537.
145. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
146. Id. at 21-22.
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fields. That is not the purpose of Title VII. Title VII was enacted to thwart
disparate treatment of women in the workplace and to provide equal
employment opportunities for everyone.147
It is illogical to assume that women can protect themselves from sexual
harassment by not entering into certain areas of work. If women were not
contemplated to work in certain fields, then the purpose of Title VII is
paralyzed.148 By holding that a woman assumes the risk, it indicates that the
victim has consented to the conduct of the defendant and therefore the victim
should not be allowed to complain at a later date.149 But is this the social value
we want to keep validating? Are these the same values that we want our sons
to learn and our daughters to endure? Little girls grow up believing they can
do anything. However, do we want to tell those same young girls that they can
grow up to do anything they choose, yet they cannot complain about
harassment or inequality later because they should have known what they were
getting themselves into? Not only is Title VII paralyzed by this attitude, but
there is also a social policy justification for not validating it.
B.

The Sixth Circuit’s Majority Approach

The Sixth Circuit took a different rationale; it expressly rejected the line of
reasoning used in Gross.150 The Sixth Circuit abandoned the Tenth Circuit’s
analysis after the plaintiff’s attorney “asked the court whether the conduct
alleged in this case would be tolerated in our courthouses.”151 The Sixth
Circuit agreed that the conduct Williams was subjected to would not be
tolerated in the courtroom, and, consequently, it rejected “the view that the
standard for sexual harassment varies depending on the work environment.”152
The Sixth Circuit majority believed that it was illogical for a woman to
have to prove “more” in her sexual harassment claims even though the only
difference between her and another is that she works in a blue collar
environment:
We do not believe that a woman who chooses to work in the male-dominated
trades relinquishes her right to be free from sexual harassment; indeed, we find
this reasoning to be illogical, because it means that the more hostile the
environment, and the more prevalent the sexism, the more difficult it is for a

147. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.
148. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
149. See Kelly Ann Cahill, Hooters: Should There be an Assumption of Risk Defense to Some
Hostile Work Environment Claims?, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1107, 1135 (1995).
150. Williams v. Gen. Motors, 187 F.3d 553, 564 (6th Cir. 1999).
151. Id.
152. Id. (emphasis in original).
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Title VII plaintiff to prove that sex-based conduct is sufficiently severe or
pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment.153

The court’s reasoning, while possibly problematic for employers, is a
refreshing new look at Title VII’s intent.154
This decision can be problematic for employers because under Faragher
and Burlington Industries, an employer can be held vicariously liable for
discrimination and harassment caused by supervisors.155 If the supervisor is
the employee causing the hostile work environment, then the employer will be
subject to vicarious liability.156 This means that employers are forced to
educate their employees regarding Title VII and the possible repercussions of
their improper actions. But, unless the employer is resisting Title VII, this is
not a bad thing. In fact, this is exactly what Title VII was meant to do.157
Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment. An
employer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from
occurring, such as affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong
disapproval, developing appropriate sanctions, informing employees of their
right to raise and how to raise the issue of harassment under Title VII, and
developing methods to sensitize all concerned.158

When reading this section, particular emphasis should be placed on “all steps
necessary.” These three words indicate that employers have an affirmative
duty to raise the bar in their work environments and to make sure that their
employees are willing to keep that bar raised. If they are not, then the
employer should be subject to liability.159
The Sixth Circuit recognized that it must look at the totality of
circumstances160 and the context of the harassment.161 But it was also aware
that those two requirements did not “mean that courts can point to longstanding or traditional hostility toward women to excuse hostile-work
environment harassment.”162 The Sixth Circuit held that by
153. Id.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 et seq. (1994).
155. See generally Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). This same vicarious liability standard was codified in the Code of
Federal Regulations: “With respect to conduct between fellow employees, an employer is
responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the employer (or its agents or
supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it can show that it
took immediate and appropriate corrective action.” 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d).
156. See generally Faragher, 524 U.S. 775; Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. 742. See also 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11(d).
157. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (1998).
158. Id. (emphasis added).
159. See generally Faragher, 524 U.S. 775; Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. 742.
160. See Harris v. Forklift System, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
161. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998).
162. Williams v. Gen. Motors, 187 F.3d 553, 564 (6th Cir. 1999).
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raising the standard for women in these professions—in essence, requiring that
they prove conduct that goes well beyond what is considered objectively
hostile in other work environments—is unnecessary, because the objective and
subjective tests set forth in Harris sufficiently ‘prevent Title VII from
expanding into a general civility code.’163

The court went on to hold that Williams must still establish objectively that the
work environment was hostile and that subjectively she perceived it to be
hostile.164 Furthermore, the court also said that
[w]hile ‘[c]ommon sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context, will
enable courts and juries to distinguish between simple teasing . . . and conduct
which a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would find severely
hostile or abusive,’ judgments by the court as to a woman’s assumption of risk
upon entering a hostile work environment are improper.165

The court recognized that it is imperative to use the totality of circumstances
test and the objective and subjective tests regarding hostile work environments,
but it was also cognizant that courts should not be placed in a position to judge
a woman’s decision to work in a traditionally male-dominated field.166
In a sense, all jobs are traditionally male-dominated, because women have
not always had the opportunity to work outside the home.167 And if this is true,
then all women are subjecting themselves to a potentially hostile work
environment. If courts follow this traditional logic underlying sexual
harassment and a woman works in a traditionally male-dominated field, then
either 1) that woman is assuming the risk by working in that field, and
therefore loses her right to make a claim about it; or 2) she can still file a
sexual harassment claim, but she must prove “more” than another woman in
the same position who works in a white collar field. This “traditional” logic
would then mandate that women in virtually all fields, be it white collar or blue
collar, would face this double-edged sword. However, this line of reasoning
doesn’t follow the purpose of Title VII—to eliminate the disparate treatment of
women in the workplace.168 In fact, this type of reasoning disables the lofty
goals of Title VII.
If we continue to follow this logic, women will not have an honest freedom
to choose their employment because they will be faced with the conception

163. Id. (citing Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81).
164. Id.
165. Id. (citing Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82) (emphasis added).
166. Id.
167. See Schultz, supra note 128, at 1918 (“After 35 years of civil rights enforcement, many
women are still scrambling for low-paying, often temporary or part-time, jobs that don’t come
close to providing a living wage or decent benefits.”).
168. See Civil Rights Act of 1964; see also supra notes 21-22.
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that some workplaces are traditionally “rough hewn and vulgar”169 and
therefore they must accept that interpretation. In today’s society, it is more
sensible to recognize that women do not assume the risk by entering
traditionally male-dominated fields. It is not logical to assume that a woman
working in a blue collar environment should have to prove more harassment
than a woman working in the white collar environment. It should not be the
court’s role to judge a woman’s choice to enter into a traditionally hostile work
environment.170 The goal of Title VII was to eliminate discrimination in
employment, not to justify it.171
C. The Sixth Circuit’s Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion in Williams, while very similar to the Tenth
Circuit’s reasoning in Gross, deserves its own analysis. By quoting Justice
Scalia’s language from Oncale, the dissent misconstrued what the Supreme
Court intended.172 It appears that Justice Scalia was merely pointing out the
difference between one set of behavior with two different meanings. But the
dissent in Williams was not urging that the statements “fucking women” and
“slut” take on a different meaning in a factory than they would in an office.173
In fact, those words are disturbing no matter what context they are uttered
under. It appears that the dissent is essentially saying that behavior in a factory
is crude and that the people who work there are used to it, so the intensity of
the crude behavior must meet a higher threshold in a factory than in an
office.174 But this is not what Justice Scalia was arguing; the dissent’s reliance
on Justice Scalia’s language is misplaced. To equate the two arguments would
be to say that Justice Scalia meant that the coach could express sexual desire or
lack of respect for a player by smacking him on the bottom because that was
just part of the game, but the same coach would be prohibited from using the
same behavior on a secretary because it is somehow less acceptable.175 This
interpretation is probably not what Justice Scalia intended his example to
mean.
Another troubling aspect of the dissent (and the Tenth Circuit’s rationale)
is that a woman who decides to enter a traditionally male-dominated
environment will have to tolerate more harassment than she would if she had
remained in a traditionally female-dominated field.176 The assumption is that
169. Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1538 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing Rabidue v.
Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1984)).
170. Williams, 187 F.3d at 564.
171. See Civil Rights Act of 1964.
172. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
173. See Severity of Harassment and Economic Class, supra note 140.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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blue collar workers are in some way less enlightened than their white collar
counterparts.177 Accordingly, it follows that blue collar workers should have
“thicker skins” when it comes to insulting or harassing behavior.178 However,
this line of reasoning seems both antiquated and highly prejudicial. It is unfair
to require a woman in a male-dominated field to put up with more harassment
than other women simply because she has exercised her freedom to choose her
work environment pursuant to Title VII. A woman should not have to be more
understanding or forgiving of abusive behavior in her work environment
simply because she has made the conscious, legal choice to be there.179
D. The Circuit Split
It is clear why the two circuits have split on this matter. While the Tenth
Circuit’s decision in Gross was handed down in 1995, it is not so antiquated to
be considered outdated. In fact, it is probably the prevailing view in light of
the Oncale decision.180 However, the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning is probably the
more favored one by women because it does not punish women for working in
a blue collar or traditionally male-dominated field.
While the Supreme Court has hinted at its feelings on the subject matter,181
it most certainly has not addressed them fully enough to be meaningful to
lower courts. At this point, there appears to be only a circuit split between two
circuits.182 While perhaps this matter might be viewed as trivial in the grand
scheme of sexual harassment claims, most victims of sexual harassment will
not regard it that way. In fact, most women who work in a blue collar or
traditionally male-dominated environment would probably see this as a
massive inconsistency. It is not logical or fair to point to a long-standing
tradition of harassment towards women to excuse, justify or sanction the
continuation of the same thing. If a woman wants to work in a factory, or
construction, or the fire department or as a truck driver, she should be able to
do so without fear of harassment. She should not have to prove “more”
177. Id.
178. See Severity of Harassment and Economic Class, supra note 140.
179. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 et seq. (1994). This statute gives a woman the legal freedom to
work where she chooses.
180. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). Even though Gross
was decided four years before Oncale, the cases take similar approaches to their reasoning. The
troubling part of the Oncale decision is that it is not clear to what “appropriate sensitivity to
social context” is referring. Id. at 82. There are at least two possible interpretations of this: 1) the
Court simply meant the social context of actions taken in the workplace, or 2) the Court meant
the social context of the entire workplace. Under either interpretation, it is easy to see how lower
courts could misconstrue or overanalyze the Court’s opinion. See also text accompanying notes
77-78.
181. Id. at 81-82.
182. Compare Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995), with Williams v.
Gen. Motors, 187 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 1999).
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harassment in her sexual harassment claims than a woman who works in a
bank, a school or Congress. It is critical for courts to address this problem if
Congress or the EEOC will not. Where work environments are traditionally
male-dominated and obscene language has always been prevalent, courts are
effectively saying that any woman who chooses to work in that field will
assume the risk of the harassment that may inevitably follow.183 Essentially,
without further action, it appears that there is no incentive to change and
workplaces that are currently “rough hewn, vulgar and crude” will continue to
be “rough hewn, vulgar and crude.”
V. CONCLUSIONS
A.

Proposed Solutions
1.

Reasons for not looking at the work environment in sexual harassment
claims

When a woman needs to file a sexual harassment claim against an
employer and she works in blue collar field, it is unclear what she needs to
prove.
All lower courts have consistently applied the “totality of
circumstances” test, as well as the objective and subjective tests of hostile
work environments.184 However, it is less than clear if the courts will look at
the work environment to determine if the standard should vary when analyzing
the claim.185 Because the two tests are thresholds in evaluating sexual
harassment claims, courts should not make it their practice to look at whether a
woman has assumed the risk by entering into a male-dominated field. This is
the Sixth Circuit’s approach.186
Critics of this approach may think it subjects employers to even higher
standards, ones that may be inherently unfair. However, employers are already
subject to vicarious liability when their employees commit sexual
harassment.187 Is it not in their best interest to follow the guidelines codified
by the EEOC in the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.)188 and prevent the
harassment in the first place, regardless of the type of work environment?
183. See Cahill, supra note 149, at 1135.
184. See generally Harris v. Forklift System, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
185. Compare Gross, 53 F.3d at 1538, with Williams, 187 F.3d at 564. There is conflict
between the Sixth and Tenth Circuits regarding whether there should be a sliding scale in
evaluating sexual harassment claims depending upon the work environment.
186. See generally Williams, 187 F.3d 553.
187. See generally Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
188. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (1998).
Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment. An employer should
take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring, such as
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It is not logical to make it more difficult for women who work in blue
collar environments to prove they have been subjected to a “more” hostile
work environment than their female counterparts who work in white collar
environments. They, more than most, should have it easier in proving their
work environment was hostile for the exact reason that courts hesitate to let
them do so. There is something inherently prejudicial in the assumption that
women who work in the blue collar industry are more callous than other
women, therefore they can handle the harassment better. It makes no sense to
subject them to “more” harassment, simply because they may be better
equipped to deal with it. Obscene language in an office is still the same
obscene language in a factory. Simply because a woman works in a factory
does not mean that being called a “slut” is somehow more justifiable. Title VII
was enacted to even the playing field.189 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit’s
reasoning that the standard for evaluating sexual harassment claims should not
vary depending upon the work environment is in the true spirit of Title VII and
should be the standard that all courts follow.
2.

Means of implementing the Sixth Circuit approach

Because there is a circuit split, the Supreme Court will have to address this
problem before any of the lower courts can apply the standard meaningfully
and consistently. The EEOC or Congress can also address this problem by
codifying it. It might be said that the EEOC has already codified its opinion in
the C.F.R. by stating that it will look at the context in which the harassment
occurred.190 However, the EEOC’s codification is simply a restatement of the
totality of circumstances test and does not fully address the issue of the varying
standards for different workplaces.
Once the Sixth Circuit’s standard has been implemented, women in blue
collar work environments will know whether their particular work environment
will dictate a stricter standard, and thus they will understand what they must
prove in order to make a successful sexual harassment claim under Title VII.
Until that time, there will remain the question of whether a woman working

affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong disapproval, developing appropriate
sanctions, informing employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of
harassment under Title VII, and developing methods to sensitize all concerned.
189. Indeed, the true purpose of Title VII was to eliminate discrimination and to promote
equal employment opportunities for all American citizens. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.
190. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b).
In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the Commission
will look at the record as a whole and at the totality of the circumstances, such as the
nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred. The
determination of the legality of a particular action will be made from the facts, on a case
by case basis.
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and living in a “man’s world” will need to prove more than a woman working
and living among the rest of the world.
B.

Conclusion

Courts should not make it their business to determine whether a woman
has assumed the risk by entering into a blue collar or traditionally maledominated environment.191 Where a woman chooses to work should not enter
into the equation at all. To vary the standard for analyzing sexual harassment
claims depending on the type of work environment is an inequitable and unjust
result.
One of the biggest problems with justifying a varying standard depending
upon the context of the work environment is that most work environments
cannot be forced into categorical assumptions of “blue collar” or “white
collar.” Most fields today incorporate blue collar and white collar traditions
into one setting. An extremely educated person may work next to an
uneducated person. Part of a business may be unionized while the other is not.
It is virtually impossible in today’s diversified business environments to
separate out the two different categories of individuals: the blue collar workers
whose crude or vulgar behavior is somehow more justified because of their
circumstances, and the white collar workers who are more fortunate because
they have chosen to work in a field that does not sanction a hostile work
environment.
If courts follow the logic of the Tenth Circuit, then all women are
subjecting themselves to a potentially hostile work environment because all
jobs are traditionally male-dominated. This then means that if a woman works
in a traditionally male-dominated field, then either 1) that woman is assuming
the risk by working in that field, and therefore loses her right to make a claim
about it; or 2) she can still file a sexual harassment claim, but she must prove
“more” than another woman in the same position who works in a white collar
field. Hopefully, this is not the result that Title VII was meant to achieve.
A more just result for women who exercise their freedom to choose their
work environment would be for courts to follow the Sixth Circuit’s
approach.192 Courts should not sanction a hostile work environment in some
blue collar or traditionally male-dominated fields simply because that is the
way it has always been and that is the way it will always be. The standard for
evaluating sexual harassment claims should not vary depending upon the work
environment.
Women are given the freedom to choose their work
environments under the mandate of Congress.193 But how free are women to
choose their work environment if they are faced with the dilemma posed by the
191. See Williams, 187 F.3d 553.
192. Id.
193. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 et seq. (1994).
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Tenth Circuit?194 Only if courts embrace the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning can
women really be free to decide for themselves where they want to work.195
It should not be presumed that women who choose to work in maledominated or blue collar fields are more callous or better equipped to deal with
harassment. Being called a “bitch” or a “slut” in a factory still holds the same
meaning to a woman who works in an office. If those words mean the same
thing in the two different environments, why should courts try to justify or
make a distinction between the two situations? There really is no difference.
And to continue to make the distinction undermines Title VII. Courts should
not make it their role to determine if a woman has assumed the risk of sexual
harassment by entering a male-dominated or blue collar field. Discrimination
and harassment are still discrimination and harassment, regardless of where
they happen and the circumstances under which they happen.
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194. See generally Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995).
195. See generally Williams, 187 F.3d 553.
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